

Stingelin, Martin. 2004. “‘Schreiben’: Einleitung [‘Writing’: Introduction].” In *‘Mir ekelt vor diesem tintenklecksenden Säkulum’: Schreibszenen im Zeitalter der Manuskripte* [“I am disgusted with this century of scribblers”: *Writing Scenes in the Age of Manuscript*], edited by Martin Stingelin, 7-21. Munich: Wilhelm Fink.

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What Is Writing?

Four chronologically ordered quotations¹ might form the historical and “systematic” theme of an introductory attempt to answer to this question.

The first quotation comes from an entry in the “Waste Books” of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (fig. 1), dated December 1776: “The letter Johann gives you was written with coffee. I would have taken blood, had there been no coffee.”²

The second quotation is from Johann Wolfgang von Goethe’s *Poetry and Truth* (1811-1830), a book that, as the title suggests, states facts that are not to be trusted. “I was so used to reciting some little poem to myself, only to forget it again,” writes Goethe,

that more once I ran to my writing stand and, without even taking the time to straighten out a sheet of paper that was lying there crookedly, actually wrote down a poem on the diagonal from beginning to end, not budging from the spot. In like fashion I also much preferred to reach for a pencil, as the more pliant instrument; for it had been my experience several times that the scraping and spurting of the pen awoke me from my somnambulist composing and distracted me so much that the little creation died at birth.³

The third quotation is from Friedrich Nietzsche, “the first mechanized philosopher,”⁴ who, in the Spring of 1882, stated, regarding the writing ball of the Danish teacher of the deaf, Hans Rasmus Malling Johan Hansen:

THE TYPEBALL IS A THING LIKE ME: MADE OF
IRON
BUT STILL EASILY BENT ON JOURNEYS.
PATIENCE AND TACT AND DELICATE FINGERS
ARE REQUIRED TO USE US.⁵

“Writing” with the computer is seen, on the one hand, for its limited technical conditions of possibility: “the act of writing has regressed to more or less trust in a hiatus between two system crashes”; on the other hand, technology inspires writing:

the good old writing tool of the past has become an employee with equal status, or more co-author, even more a life partner, and if you don’t permanently argue with it, and regularly make up with it, then, like a life partner, it gives us, in succession, a new worldview, a new aesthetic, a new vocabulary, new material. And last but not least, nourished by the experience of chat forums, come new forms, new rhythms, reduced to staccato essentials, with new narrative tempos, new narrative structures and strategies.⁶

These four citations have in common the way they are each made present as a scene, as a staging, which means:

1. the writing remains writing, by and in itself, while also thematizing, reflecting on, and problematizing itself, thereby creating a framework that removes it from everyday life, while at the same time lifting it onto a stage, where it presents and shows itself;
2. in this process various roles, according to role ascriptions and distributions, are allocated there; and those in turn pose
3. the question of the director of these acts.

And now to briefly explain these particulars with regards to the four quotations:

“The letter Johann gives you was written with coffee. If not for coffee, I would have used blood.” The corporeality of this note, likely pertaining to Lichtenberg’s first satirical-poeticological novel, was revealed by the laconic commentary of its first publisher Albert Leitzmann, who simultaneously raised the question of whether this corporeality was reproducible by means of an editorial technique or could only be described: “This remark was written with thin coffee in the original.”⁷ Lichtenberg’s delight in experimentation—in opposition to Karl Von Moor’s line from Friedrich Schiller’s drama *The Robbers*: “I hate this age of scribblers”⁸ — thus also extends to his writing tools and their materiality, which he explicitly thematizes as a

fundamental precondition of his writings: "It sounds ridiculous, but it is true: if you want to write something good, you must have a good quill, especially one that, without much pressure, writes with ease."⁹ A "good quill" guarantees that the flow of thought does not begin to stutter alongside the flow of writing because the writer does not have to exert physical pressure, but can let his ideas run free. In this way, a part of poetic autonomy is surrendered to the writing tool—expressly, the part that results in success and aesthetic quality. In this note, *ex negativo*, Lichtenberg thematizes the writer's dependence on the materiality, the stubbornness, and the self-determination of his writing tool, which either largely frees him from the harsh physicality of the act of writing or throws him back into it. The quill itself seems—in the positive sense—to be the director.

The same is the case—in the negative sense—with Goethe, where, for this very reason, the quill must give way to the pencil. Goethe presents his study as a peep-box stage, that allows for a glimpse into the *dispositif*, i.e. into the technical preconditions of his writing and its most efficient set-up. On this stage, he presents himself as actor, engaged participant, and director. In this spectacle of the self, he seizes the role of the almighty, autonomous, rule-making authority, as he—already we feel a moment of heteronomy—passes over the quill, which, apparently, with its indomitable self-determination, opposes his writing, and grabs a pencil instead, which, explicitly, "more willingly surrenders its writing." So the self-determination of the writing tool in the form of the quill stands opposed to a greater "willingness" in the form of the pencil. The "will to power" lies only, as Friedrich Nietzsche says, with the author who overpowers his writing tool. At the same time, the scene presented by Goethe proves to be role play in that he takes on the various roles of author, writer, and scribe,¹⁰ thus aligning himself with the philosopher René Descartes: "It would be the same if I awoke at night, and often I had the urge

to imitate one of my predecessors by having a leather doublet made for myself and getting accustomed to capture in the dark, through feeling, whatever had unexpectedly flashed through my mind.”¹¹ Johann Peter Eckermann, Goethe's secretary and clerk, is in turn wholly enchanted by Goethe's role play when he writes in 1842: "Somnambular producing, didn't have the courage to straighten out a crooked sheet of paper, out of fear of shooing away the ghosts. Write nights in the dark. Slate. Leather doublet."¹² Writing, especially in the shadow of more powerful predecessors than Goethe, has something ghostly about it; for just this reason, in 1912 Franz Kafka planned to write an essay titled "Goethe's Frightful Nature." Goethe represents in his self-understanding—and thus his spectacle of the self—a powerful concept of writing that believes almost entirely in the possibility of being independent of its material and physical conditions. This self-understanding—we shall call it “classical”—inaugurated its own tradition after Goethe.

Nietzsche, in his role-play, appears to even mistake himself for his writing tool: "THE TYPEBALL IS A THING LIKE ME: MADE OF IRON." He writes, even needs a writing tool on which he is in some way dependent. This dependence can certainly escalate into an existential experience. Nietzsche identifies with his typewriter not only in its corporeality and materiality; he also sees himself, albeit not without reluctance, at times dissolving into the writing of his books: "There [Nietzsche here thinks of his own works] is something in these that always fills me with a sense of shame; they are counterfeits of a suffering, imperfect nature, but inadequately equipped with the most essential organs—to myself, I, as a whole, often seem little more than the scratching upon a piece of paper made by an unknown power with the object of trying a *new quill*."¹³ At best, the writing tool and the one who believes to direct it, while at the same time being directed by it, are “life partners,” as Matthias Politycki writes—who, by the way, is in

complete agreement with Nietzsche's dictum: "OUR WRITING TOOLS WORK ALONG WITH OUR THOUGHTS."¹⁴

From the perspective of the writing process, Literature thus presents itself in a new light.

But how can one summarize these different moments of "writing"—its framework, its role ascriptions and distributions, its directorial role—in one term?¹⁵

Resistance, as characterized by Friedrich Nietzsche's polemic *On the Genealogy of Morals*—and as is the case with all the unwilling writing tools from the quotations given above—is primarily involved in the independent force of lists, tactics, and strategies. The historical method of genealogy does not merely interpret "the whole history of a 'thing,' an organ, a tradition," such as writing, as "a continuous chain of signs, continually revealing new interpretations and adaptations [...], the causes of which need not be connected even amongst themselves, which sometimes rather just follow and replace one another at random"—but also adds to it the "resistances produced every time" against these overwhelming processes.¹⁶ For the critical history of genealogy, a method Michel Foucault outlined following Nietzsche, the body is the venue for this history: "Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the articulation of the body and history," says Michel Foucault in his 1971 article "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History." "Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted by history and the process of history's destruction of the body."¹⁷

The fact is that corporeality and the instrumentality of the act of writing as the source of resistance that must be overcome have, thus far, remained largely absent from literary studies. The latter has limited itself to the treatment of the history of writing from the perspective of semantics—mainly, the history of literature, of rhetoric, and of poetics.¹⁸ For a long time, even Roland Barthes understood the term *écriture*—which he shaped himself and which still

determines research on the writing processes in literary studies—only in the metaphorical sense, or as a site of the “general choice of tone, of ethos, if you like, and this is precisely where the writer shows himself clearly as an individual because this is where he commits himself [*s’engager*].”¹⁹ What happens, though, if the writer “commits himself” to the accompanying circumstances of his writing, such as the writing tool he supposedly chose himself? Considering the primary definition of the verb *s’engager*, as it is given in the *Oxford-Hachette French/English Dictionary*, the word can mean “to hire (*personnel*),” “to enlist (*soldat*),” and also “to engage (*orchestre, danseur*).”²⁰ So it is once again that one or more scenes present themselves in such a way that writing in general and the writing tool in particular recruit a writer for service by asking to play and to dance. Goethe certainly wanted the hand to lead, and that is why he went for the pencil and not for the quill: so his choice would not remind him of the material, instrumental, and corporeal preconditions of writing. Barthes, for his part, only twenty years after he formed the term *écriture* for “an art of the resurgence of the body” in his treatise, *Writing Degree Zero* (1953), understood “the manual sense of the word.” The following quotation takes shape against the background of what, in the meantime, changed following the mechanization and digitization of writing:

Today, twenty years later, by a sort of return to the body, I want to pursue the manual sense of the word; it’s the “scription” (the muscular act of writing, of tracing letters) that interests me: this gesture through which the hand takes up a tool (stylus, reed, quill), applies it to a surface, moves it forward while weighing or caressing and traces regular, recurrent, rhythmic forms [...]. The question here will therefore be about the gesture, and not metaphorical meanings of the word “writing”: we will only speak of manuscript, which implies traces left by the hand.²¹

In fact, in research on the writing process in literary studies we deal with the problem of how metaphorically the terms “writing practices” and “writing” may be understood, or should be understood, because the form of reading depends on them. The metaphorization of the “term”

“writing” stands against the heterogeneity of the act of writing that Vilém Flusser problematizes in his phenomenology of the writing gesture, which in itself consists of many different elements:

To be able to write, we need—among other things—the following: a surface (a piece of paper), a tool (a fountain pen), characters (letters), a convention (the meaning of the letters), rules (orthography), a system (grammar), a system that signifies the system of language (semantic knowledge of a language), a message to be written (ideas), and writing. The complexity results not so much from the number of essential factors as from their heterogeneity. The fountain pen is at a level of reality different from that of, say, grammar, ideas, or a reason to write.²²

Depending on which element from the heterogeneous ensemble one privileges as the “actual” moment of writing, to which all other elements will be subordinated as mere auxiliary functions, a variety of writing terms come into being that appear more or less metaphorical from each other’s perspective. Whoever feels himself filled with a message, an idea, to be written, might not hold off his “in-spiration” [*Be-geisterung*] to communicate it for the automaton of semantic, grammatical, or orthographic rules—not to mention the mechanism, the use of a tool in play with a surface that must be there for a sign to be expressed at all. The “Idea,” in the emphatic sense of the word, is characterized precisely by the fact that whether it has actually been put to paper or not remains an unchallenged fact. An “Idea” is an “Idea,” even if there is no writing tool that can hammer open the skull in which it was born. In direct contrast with the complexity of the interaction, which presupposes extensive exercise, between surface, writing tool, and character—paper, pen, and letters—is the notion that the external sign of writing has the innermost meaning. To the calligrapher, the supposedly “actual” object of writing—the “message to be written,” meaning the “higher” “Ideas”—can go to hell.²³ And really: what idea, when regrettably dependent on letters alone—and when ever so spidery-scribbled at that—is expressed in such a way that it could even begin to compete with the most fulfilled? Both the privileging of Ideas as the single, highest value—to which surface, writing tool, signs, and expression must submit—as

well as the privileging of the most fully-formed calligraphy, enabled by a tool working on a surface, with which an idea can then play dress-up as a message to be written that semantics, systems, grammars, orthographies, or at least conventions have to obey: both are only partial answers to the question, “what is writing?”

Rüdiger Campe, on the other hand, has forged the term “scene of writing” [*Schreibszene*] for the *ensemble* of heterogeneous factors in its insolubility as literary writing: “Also and especially when ‘the scene of writing’ is not a self-evident framing of the scene, but a non-stable ensemble of speech, instrumentality, and gesture, it can still mark precisely this undertaking of literature as this problematic ensemble, this difficult framing.”²⁴ It is this framing that constantly changes over the course of the literary history of writing.

Coming back to this distinction, made only implicitly by Campe, in what follows we understand the “scene of writing” as the changing constellation of writing that varies historically and individually from author to author and that constitutes itself in the framework of language (semantics of writing), instrumentality (technology of writing), and gesture (corporeality of writing), without these factors themselves becoming problematic as object or resistor; where this ensemble in its heterogeneity and non-stability begins to grasp itself—begins to thematize, problematize, and reflect on itself—we speak of a “writing scene” [*Schrieb-Szene*]. The singularity of every “writing scene” springs from the processuality of writing; the singularity that prompts (self-)reflection (without, that is, in its heterogeneity and non-stability becoming entirely transparent to itself). In this fashion, we attempt to bring together with the term “scene of writing” as with the “writing scene,” respectively, (literary-, media-technical- and cultural) history and a systematic moment in an integrative model of writing.²⁵

Everyone learns writing (and reading) in school, without being taught that writing itself has many faces and a varied history. In the narrower sense of the literary act, the term “writing” emphasizes the productive-aesthetic moment of the creative work-process that goes through a number of different phases from inception, organization, formulation, inscription, revision, and correction to publication. Especially here, in the conceptualization of the different phases of writing, the linguistic research on writing-process has done important work.²⁶ The “step-children” of this writing-process research—research which is largely methodologically limited to cognitive psychological introspection that was imported as part of the so-called “problem-solving model” from pedagogical classroom composition research²⁷ and that tends to neglect the eventfulness of the writing act itself in its materiality, positivity and contingency—are the writing tools and their obstinacy as they occasionally resist the writerly production-process.

Process documents itself in handwritten or typographic traces, such as its preparatory work (excerpts, notes and fragments, outlines), drafts, variants, manuscripts-in-progress, galleys, and corrected proofs. And it can be systematized according to three rhetorical categories of change: the system of deletions, replacements, and rearrangements. Of the writing tools available (according to the ruled paper, quill and ink, pencil, ballpoint pen, typewriter, or computer), writing habits (occasion, place, moment, duration), the stimulants and surrogates of inspiration for overcoming oft-lamented writer’s block (as well as social situations), biographical daily life and its aesthetic and political self-awareness involves writing in an array of “Accompanying Circumstances,” to quote the beautifully casual title Uwe Johnson gave his lectures on poetics at University of Frankfurt in May 1979.

Such an understanding of “writing” does not merely exhaust itself by enumerating all of the elements of writing commonly summarized by this obstinate word in everyday use—as

Vilém Flusser does at the end of his analysis of writing, where he writes: “and Writing”²⁸—but integrates these elements.

To summarize: the enumerated “accompanying circumstances” of writing can essentially be bundled into three—heterogeneous among themselves, presupposing each other and not conceivably independent of each other in the act of writing—factors (semantics, technology, and corporeality), from which a historically as well as individually singular “scene of writing” in general, and a “writing scene” in particular, assembles anew for every author, poet, or prose writer. That is why the concept of writing also enables the comparison of different authors, particularly in their incomparability. If one only sticks to the historical criterion of chronology, one cannot see how it becomes ever more visible through the media-technical-historical transformations of writing itself, enabled by inventions such as the typewriter or the computer, and the distortions of the simultaneity of non-simultaneity resulting from these.

The simultaneity of non-simultaneity: where Goethe proves himself to be master of dissimulation by not really writing in the “actual,” material, corporeal sense, as if no resistance has been encountered—the production of his poetic self-evidence also being part of the semantics of his writing—Lichtenberg misses no opportunity to stay with these very material and corporeal preconditions of his writing and to make them its subject. We may side with Goethe, when he says about Lichtenberg: “we can make use of Lichtenberg’s writings as the most wondrous divining rod; where he makes a joke, a problem lies concealed.”²⁹ Indeed, under closer scrutiny, the resistance that writing, in the emphatic sense of the word, must overcome begins to reproduce itself on the various levels that unite in the term “writing.” This resistance occurs not only in the “accompanying circumstances” of writing that are—supposedly—external to an author, especially in the form of writing tools. In the very letter to his secretary Heinrich

Köselitz, alias Peter Gast, where Nietzsche confirms, “YOU ARE RIGHT—OUR WRITING TOOLS WORK ALONG WITH OUR THOUGHTS,” the writing ball wrestles away from him the desperate statement: “WHEN WILL I FINALLY CONVINCING MY FINGERS TO TYPE OUT A LONG SENTENCE!”³⁰ At this point of resistance in Nietzsche’s use of the writing ball of deaf-mute teacher Hans Rasmus Johan Malling Hansen comes a surprise in the form of a charming historical “typo,” which makes us aware of the fact that the source of resistance that appears in writing also can be found in the *innermost place* of the author, the “unconscious”:

WHEN I INTERPRET MYSELF, I GET WRAPPED UP IN MYSELF
 THUS MAY A FREUD BE MY INTERPRETER.
 AND WHEN HE ENTERS ON HIS OWN PATH
 HE CARRIES THE IMAGE OF A FRIEND WITH HIM³¹

In any case, this was the belief of psychiatrist Eugen Bleuler as well as his correspondent Sigmund Freud. So it was from the writing experiments that Eugen Bleuler conducted in his letters to Sigmund Freud that there developed a strange marriage of outer resistances in the form of writing tools and inner resistances in the form of the unconscious, leading Bleuler to choose a typewriter to write down his dreams. How, then, can one write about the unconscious so that the unconscious itself is given expression? Bleuler used to write his dreams and dream interpretations intentionally as an inexperienced user of a typewriter—linking the interpretation of dreams experimentally with the simultaneous development of the Burghölzli “word-association tests.” The accumulation of typos allowed neuroses to be revealed, as these had to be the result of resistances in the unconscious: “As long as one does not have too much practice, the typewriter is a very good reagent of neuroses. It is hellishly frustrating, though, that I don’t express mine unless I already know them.”³² This is what Bleuler on November 5, 1905, wrote to Freud, who had opened the floodgates to the sources of these resistances in the first place, but

who, perhaps for this very reason, seemed to have resisted the use of a typewriter throughout his life: simultaneity of non-simultaneity.

Three factors: every work of literary writing employs a semantics (speech), which can only be given symbolic expression through the use of a writing tool (instrumentality), namely through a specific corporeality of writing acts (gesture), which can extend from handwritten scratch with the quill through the hammering of the typewriter up to the ephemerality of the voice while dictating—“scene of writing” or, respectively, “writing scene.” In this sense—to repeat once more, emphatically—the practice of writing, especially as a literary activity, cannot be defined generally, but only re-constructed historically and philologically in each individual case and after the fact.

Trans. Blake Bronson-Bartlett, Julia Sattler and Stefan Schöberlein

¹ Trans. note: citations of primary and secondary sources throughout are based on English translations, when available, and cited accordingly, with the German source used by Stingelin in brackets. When English translations are not available, the German source is cited, and the English translation is our own.

² Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, *Aphorismen, Drittes Heft: 1775-1779* (Berlin: B. Behr’s Verlag 1906), p. 183. The fragment appears in the December 1776 entry of “Waste Book” F. Image courtesy of NsSUB Göttingen, Handschriftenabteilung, Cod. Ms. Licht. IV, 30: Sudelbuch F, page 35, lines 4-6.

³ Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *From My Life: Poetry and Truth, Part Four*, trans. Robert R. Heitner (New York: Suhrkamp Publishers, 1987), p. 525 [*Dichtung und Wahrheit* in *Goethes Werke. Hamburger Ausgabe, Band 10* (München: C. H. Beck, 1966), pp. 80-81].

⁴ See Friedrich Kittler, “Nietzsche, der mechanisierte Philosoph,” *kultuRRevolution* 9 (June 1985): 25-29; see also Friedrich Kittler, *Gramophone, Film, Typewriter*, trans. Geoffrey Winthrop-Young and Michael Wutz (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), pp. 200-14 [*Grammophon – Film – Typewriter* (Berlin: Brinkmann + Bose, 1986), pp. 299-310]; for a media-historical discourse analysis of writing in general, see *Discourse Networks 1800/1900*, trans. Michael Metteer with Chris Cullens (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990) [*Aufschreibesysteme 1800/1900* (München: Fink, 1995)].

⁵ Friedrich Nietzsche, *Schreibmaschinentexte. Vollständige Edition, Faksimiles und kritischer Kommentar, aus dem Nachlaß herausgegeben von Stephan Günzel und Rüdiger Schmidt-Grépály* (Weimar: Bauhaus-Universitätsverlag, 2002), p. 61.

⁶ Matthias Politycki, “Der Autor als Zeuwart. Digitale Schriftstellerei—der selbstverschuldete Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner Mündigkeit,” *Frankfurter Rundschau* 130.8 (June 2002): 21.

⁷ Lichtenberg, *Aphorismen*, p. 457.

⁸ Friedrich Schiller, “The Robbers” in *The Robbers and Wallenstein*, trans. F.J. Lamport (New York: Penguin Books, 1979), p. 35. [*Die Räuber. Ein Schauspiel* (1781), I.2 in *Sämtliche Werke, Erster Band: Gedichte, Dramen I* (München: Carl Hanser 1987), pp. 491-618, 502.]

⁹ Georg Christoph Lichtenberg, *Schriften und Briefe, II*, ed. Wolfgang Promies (Wien: Carl Hanser 1968-1992), p. 194.

¹⁰ See also “‘er war im Grunde der eigentliche Schriftsteller, während ich bloss der Autor war‘. Friedrich Nietzsches Poetologie der Autorschaft als Paradigma des französischen Poststrukturalismus (Roland Barthes, Gilles Deleuze, Michel Foucault),” in *Autorschaft: Positionen und Revisionen*, ed. Heinrich Detering (Stuttgart: J.B. Metzler Verlag, 2002), pp. 80-106.

¹¹ Goethe, *From My Life: Poetry and Truth, Part Four*, p. 525 [*Dichtung und Wahrheit*, 10: 80.]

¹² For the haunting of Goethe's texts by Descartes' spirit and the spirit of Descartes' spirit in Goethe's texts in Eckermann's texts, see Avital Ronell, *Dictations: On Haunted Writing* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986). The Eckermann quotation is on page 115, and can be found in Avital Ronell, *Der Goethe-Effekt. Goethe – Eckermann – Freud*, trans. Ulrike Dünkelsbühler (München: Wilhelm Fink, 1994), p. 69.

¹³ Letter 143, Friedrich Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz from Venice, Sils-Maria, late August 1881, in Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Briefe, VI. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli andazzino Montinari, (München: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), pp. 121-23.

¹⁴ Friedrich Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz from Venice (typescript), [Genoa,] late February 1882, in *Schreibmaschinentexte*, p. 18.

¹⁵ See also "Schreiben" in Georg Braungart et al, *Reallexikon der deutschen Literaturwissenschaft: Neubearbeitung des Reallexikons der deutschen Literaturgeschichte, Volume III: P–Z*, ed. Jan-Dirk Müller, (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2003), pp. 387-89.

¹⁶ Friedrich Nietzsche, *On the Genealogy of Morality*, trans. Carol Diethe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 51. [*Zur Genealogie der Moral. Eine Streitschrift in Sämtliche Werke. Kritische Studienausgabe*, ed. Giorgio Colli undazzino Montinari (München: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), p. 314.]

¹⁷ Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History" in *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry Simon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 139-64, 148. ["Nietzsche, die Genealogie, die Historie," in *Von der Subversion des Wissens*, ed. and trans. Walter Seitter (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1987), pp. 69-90, 75; translation slightly modified from Michel Foucault,

“Nietzsche, la généalogie, l’histoire,” in *Hommage à Jean Hyppolite* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971), pp. 145-72, 154: “La généalogie, comme analyse de la provenance, est donc à l’articulation du corps et de l’histoire. Elle doit montrer le corps tout imprimé d’histoire, et l’histoire ruinant le corps.” See also Martin Stingelin, “Körper als Schauplatz der Historie. Albert Hermann Post, Friedrich Nietzsche, Michel Foucault” in *FRAGMENTE. Schriftenreihe zur Psychoanalyse* 31 (October 1989), pp. 119-31; “Zur Genealogie der Genealogie. Josef Kohler, Albert Hermann Post, Friedrich Nietzsche und Michel Foucault: Vergleichend-ethnologische Strafrechtsgeschichte als Paradigma method(olog)ischer Instrumentalisierungen,” in Kurt Seelmann, ed, *Nietzsche und das Recht* (Basel: Franz Steiner, 2001), pp. 169-79.]

¹⁸ This still applies to equipment in the new anthology on this theme, in which writing is to be understood as “historical meaning Absolutum”; see Christian Schärf, “Einleitung. Schreiben. Eine Sinngeschichte,” in *Schreiben. Szenen einer Sinngeschichte* (Tübingen: Attempto Verlag, 2002), pp. 7-26, 14. For notable exceptions among contributions to this anthology, see Sandro Zanetti, “Auf den Spuren einer Irrfahrt ins Ungewisse“ in *Schreiben: Szenen einer Sinngeschichte*, ed. Christian Schärf (Tübingen: Attempto, 2002). Last accessed 07.07.2003. <http://iasl.uni-muenchen.de/rezensio/liste/zanetti.html>.

¹⁹ Roland Barthes, *Writing Degree Zero and Elements of Semiology*, trans. Annette Lavers and Colin Smith (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 13. See also Roland Barthes, *Le degré zéro de l’écriture suivi de Nouveaux essais critiques* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1972), p. 14. [Roland Barthes, *Am Nullpunkt der Literatur*, trans. Helmut Scheffel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1982), p. 20.]

²⁰ Trans: this commentary has been slightly altered from the original to reflect the use of the *Oxford-Hachette* rather than a German foreign language dictionary. Stingelin's interest in the sense of the "dance" remains nevertheless (along with the political undertones that are presumably Barthes'). See "Engager," *The Oxford-Hachette French Dictionary*, ed. Marie-Hélène Corréard and Valeire Grundy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001); see also "s'engager," the reflexive form used by Barthes, the definitions of which are "to promise," "to embark (on a project)," and "to get involved."

²¹ Roland Barthes, "Variations sur l'écriture" in *Oeuvres complètes. Tome II: 1966-1973*, ed. Éric Marty (Paris: Éditions du Seuil 1994), pp. 1535-74.

²² Vilém Flusser, *Gestures*, trans. Nancy Ann Roth (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 20. [Vilém Flusser, "Die Geste des Schreibens," in *Gesten. Versuch einer Phänomenologie* (Düsseldorf: Bollmann, 1991), pp. 39-49, 40. The consideration of resistances that have to be overcome in the act of writing is analogous to the Nietzschean method of genealogy; for Flusser, it is practically a criterion for distinguishing between good and bad literary criticism in the extended sense of "criticism" (also because for him, ultimately, the "resistance of words" remains in the foreground): "Such a question [i.e.: 'what am I trying to express?'] offers a criterion for dividing literary criticism into two kinds, a stupid kind that would ask, 'What does he want to say?' and a clever kind that would ask, 'In the face of what obstacles has he said what he said?'" (22). ["Man kann die Literaturkritik nach diesem Kriterium einteilen. In die dumme, die fragt: 'Was will er sagen?' und die kluge, die fragt: 'Durch welche Hindernisse hindurch hat er gesagt, was er eben gesagt hat?'" (44).]

²³ See Sabine Mainberger, *Schriftskeptis. Von Philosophen, Mönchen, Buchhaltern, Kalligraphen* (München: Fink, 1995), pp. 132-95. The "Copyist in Literature" is of great interest

to the matter at hand because it problematizes the resistance that arises from the tension between “copying out”—in the emphatic sense of the word—and “writing” in such a way that the former becomes a more humble task than the latter, given the emphasis always placed on the sense of the latter; see also Hans-Jost Frey, *Lesen und Schreiben* (Basel/Weil am Rhein/Wien: Urs Engeler Editor, 1998), pp. 60-69, “Abschreiben,” and pp. 77-80, “Kalligraphie.”

²⁴ Rüdiger Campe, “Die Schreibszene, Schreiben,” in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht und K. Ludwig Pfeiffer, eds., *Paradoxien, Dissonanzen, Zusammenbrüche. Situationen offener Epistemologie*, (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), pp. 759-72, 760.

²⁵ The mapping of writing in four dimensions—writing as handwork (the technological dimension of writing), writing as sign production (the semiotic dimension of writing), writing as speech (the linguistic dimension of writing), and the integration of writing in a context of action (the operative dimension of writing)—has led Otto Ludwig to make the typological distinction between “integrated” and “non-integrated writing,” which, by virtue of that contrast, limits and separates the crafted, technological dimension—including copying and/or calligraphy—from the production of text. See Otto Ludwig, “Integriertes und nicht-integriertes Schreiben. Zu einer Theorie des Schreibens: eine Skizze,” in Jürgen Baurmann und Rüdiger Weingarten, eds., *Schreiben. Prozesse, Prozeduren und Produkte* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1995), pp. 273-87. This fertile linguistic distinction makes literary studies the victim of circumstance, as it broaches not only the semiotic, linguistic and operative dimensions of literary writing, but now also its crafted, technological dimension can become an indispensable prerequisite for thematizing, problematizing and reflecting.

²⁶ For critical and method(olog)ically fruitful continuation of the linguistic research on the writing-process, see Hanspeter Ortner, *Schreiben und Denken* (Tübingen; Max Niemeyer, 2000);

for the limitations and reservations of this view from a literary studies perspective, however, see the review by Stephan Kammer, “Jenseits des ‚Texts‘. Zwei neue Studien zum Schreiben und zur Typographie,” in *Text. Kritische Beiträge* 8 (2003): 119-25, esp. 119-22.

²⁷ For an overview, see Arne Wrobel, *Schreiben als Handlung. Überlegungen und Untersuchungen zur Theorie der Textproduktion* (Tübingen; Max Niemeyer, 1995).

²⁸ In this witty postscript to his determination of the gesture of writing, Flusser conceptually approaches the difficult, impalpable moment that withdraws repeatedly and precisely at this point of conceptualization.

²⁹ Johann Wolfgang Goethe, *Wilhelm Meister*, trans. H.M. Waidson (Surrey: Alma Classics, 2013), p. 840. [*Wilhelm Meisters Wanderjahre*, ed. Gerhard Neumann und Hans-Georg Dewitz (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1989), p. 761.]

³⁰ Friedrich Nietzsche to Heinrich Köselitz from Venice (typescript), [Genoa,] late February 1882, in Nietzsche, *Schreibmaschinentexte*, p. 18.

³¹ Nietzsche, *Schreibmaschinentexte*, 89: it actually says “FREUD” – not a printer’s error!

³² Eugen Bleuler to Sigmund Freud, 5 November 1905; cited in Lydia Marinelli and Andreas Mayer, “Vom ersten Methodenbuch zum historischen Dokument. Sigmund Freuds Traumdeutung im Prozeß ihrer Lektüren (1899–1930),” in Marinelli and Mayer, eds., *Die Lesbarkeit der Träume. Zur Geschichte von Freuds Traumdeutung* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2002), pp. 37-125, 53-54.